Research
Views are my own and do not necessarily represents those of my current or past employers
Views are my own and do not necessarily represents those of my current or past employers
"Who Bears the Costs of Inflation? Euro Area Households and the 2021-23 Shock" with Gonzalo Paz-Pardo (ECB), Jirka Slacalek (ECB) , Oreste Tristani (ECB) and Gianluca Violante (Princeton) [paper], [ungated version] Journal of Monetary Economics (2024).
Presentations: ECB DGR, Bank of Italy, Risksbank*, UCL, HFCN*, CESifo, JRC Ispra*, CEBRA Annual Meeting (NY FED/Columbia SIPA)*, Banco de Portugal*, EEA-ESEM (Barcelona GSE), Science Po*, Central Bank of Ireland, European Commission*. NBP Warsaw*, CBB*, Hamburg*, NBER conference on Inflation*, BIS*, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, SED Meetings (Barcelona)*, CEBRA (Frankfurt), IMF*. * indicates presentations done by coauthors.
Coverage: Bloomberg, VoxEu, ECB Research Bulletin, FAZ
Abstract: We measure the heterogeneous first-order welfare effects of the recent inflation surge across households in the euro area. A simple framework illustrating the numerous transmission channels of surprise inflation to household welfare guides our empirical exercise. By combining micro data and aggregate time series, we conclude that: (i) country-level average welfare costs – expressed as a share of triennial income – were sizable and heterogeneous: around 3% in France and Spain, 7% in Germany, and 9% in Italy; (ii) this inflation episode resembles an age-dependent tax, with the retirees losing up to 14%, and roughly half of the 25–44 year-old winning; (iii) losses were quite uniform across consumption quantiles because rigid rents served as a hedge for the poor; (iv) nominal net positions were the key driver of heterogeneity across-households; (v) the rise in energy prices generated vast variation in individual-level inflation rates, but unconventional fiscal policies helped shield households. The counterpart of this household-sector loss is a significant gain for the government.
"The Fisher Channel According to HANK: Unexpected Inflation and the Missing Recession" [paper]
Presentations: UCL, Paris School of Economics, Bank of England, ECB DGR, Queen Mary University of London, EEA Congress (Rotterdam), Swiss Macro Workshop (Sils-Maria), ICMAIF, JEDC-Conference 2025 (Gerzensee).
Abstract: This paper argues that the post-pandemic U.S. expansion has been partly sustained by Fisher-type redistribution from nominal creditors to nominal debtors. I build a Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian model with long-term nominal claims disciplined to two micro targets: the cross-section of net nominal positions (NNP) and the covariance between NNP and marginal propensities to consume (MPCs). Feeding in the realized 2021–22 price-level surprise, the model implies an impact rise in aggregate consumption of about 0.5% and a moderate but persistent increase in inflation of about 0.3pp. A behavioral extension, capturing households’ partial awareness of debt devaluation, dampens the impact response yet prolongs the effects. I validate the mechanism using a large U.S. fintech panel (430k households, daily flows), combining cross-sectional variation in baseline exposures with local-projection dynamics: results are consistent with the model and lean towards the behaviorial extension. Finally, I show that an active Fisher channel amplifies conventional monetary policy and reshapes the role of nominal rigidities in its transmission to aggregate demand.
"Winners and Losers from Unexpected Inflation" [paper], submitted
Presentations: UCL, Surrey, ECB, Naples, ECB Macroprudential Analysis Group (MPAG), London Business School, Mannheim
Abstract: I document the evolution of nominal positions in the US over the last two decades and estimate the redistributive effects of several inflation episodes. I find that the US government gained around 4.5% of US GDP from the 2021 inflation shock, essentially at the expense of foreigners. In addition, there has been a significant concentration of nominal assets among the wealthiest middle-aged and elderly households, who lost substantially. Most other groups of households gained on average. The financial sector is extremely exposed to anticipated inflation. Raising the inflation target by 2pp would have generated a modest gain for the household sector, especially at the start of the Great Recession.
"The Short Term Effects of Monetary Policy", with Lennart Brandt (BoE) , Johannes Fisher (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Carl-Wolfram Horn (Frankfurt School), Silvia Miranda-Agrippino (NY Fed) [poster]
Presentations: Bank of England*, St. Gallen, ESCB Heads of Research Meeting*, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, JEDC-Conference 2025 (Gerzensee)*. * indicates presentations done by coauthors.
Abstract: We study the speed of transmission of monetary to economic activity in the UK, exploiting a novel dataset of daily private consumption spending, online prices, and posted vacancies. We find that high frequency identified monetary policy surprises have significant short-run effects on household spending and posted vacancies in the UK, with both variables responding within days. This quick consumption response can be explained by heightened consumer attention and fear of unemployment in response to contractionary monetary policy surprises. On the other hand, prices react more sluggishly with a significant response only after around 100 days. These results provide new evidence on the speed of the monetary policy transmission that went undetected previously because of the focus on lower-frequency data.
"Measuring Intertemporal MPC with high-frequency data", with Richard Blundell (UCL), Vasco Carvalho (Cambridge) , Tao Chen (UCL), Stephen Hansen (UCL) and Gianluca Violante (Princeton)
"Shock propagation and heterogeneous MPCs across industries"
Presentations: UCL, Stanford ECON 234